Hegel philosophy and his works are still profound

Hegel was born in 1770, in
Stuttgart, a city in the south of Germany. He is known as a famous modern
professional philosopher. The influence of his ideas, his philosophy and his
works are still profound and studied. Throughout his philosophical working
life, the ideas of Freedom, Reason and Progress always inspired him. However,
at some points, his ideas are famously hard to be understood fully and rightly,
for example, the notion of “God” in his works. In Hegel’s thinking, which is
known as the matured thinking, the notion of “God” is the expression of the
rational truths. He also mentioned the notions of Reason or Mind as equal to
“God”. So what does the notion of “God” really mean and why does Hegel choose
the notion of “God”. This paper will look deeply into his philosophy to
understand his idea of “God” and how the idea affects the freedom in history.



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contradictory philosophies to Hegel


When Kant, (1724 – 1804)
demonstrated the moral theory, his argument against the ontological proof of
God. In his philosophy, he supported neither the existence nor non-existence of
God. According to him, the concept of God does not prove the existence of God.
The existence cannot be predicated, its actuality can be only a rational
philosophy presupposition. The existence can only be proved only if that Being
reveals itself. The Supreme Being’s existing is out of the intelligence of
human being and human reason. Whit their power of reason, they are not able to
the existence of the Providence. However, on the other side, it is also
important that they cannot prove God’s inexistence either (Petrescu, 2013). The presentation of the character which
come from the illusion of deist arguments does not give a sign giving up the
project of a religion based on Reason. The
presupposition of the existence of God is the initiating point and can
only be infer when the existence is already known in certain and granted. The
God in Kant is the as non-Absolute and the “Actual” belief, the faith
in God’s existence. For Kant, the
ultimate goal of the concept of God is the moral of human being. No one is
possible to rationally prove the existence of God however the moral life cannot
begin without God’s existence. It seems like the existence of Supreme Being is
essential and unconditioned. In addition, in the imperfect life of human
Beings, God is the perfect Being whom they can compare their knowledge and
behaviors with. And based on the comparison, individuals could create some
criteria for themselves to correct their actions and knowledge. However, human
being alone cannot be able to reach the Absolute Being through their owned
underwent knowledge: instead, the thing they can do to unreachable knowledge
and God is to presuppose the factuality of supreme phenomenon  indicated as transcendental object of
something they cannot even explain what it is in itself. For Kant,
transcendental object is generated by consciousness so that the world is not a
simple world of representations without objective substratum. Inferring the
absolute essential existence from the imperfection of the contingent being is known
transcendental argument. According to the author, the principles of reason as
well as the idea of God are indeed because the possibility of systematic
knowledge of nature exists, only when we enable it.  For that reason, it causes the natural process
of human reason. Reason generates by chasing the idea of the existence of
essential being. In this being, the characteristic of unconditioned existence
is acknowledged. Then the existence is expandable to the notion of the
independence of all other things – in other words, in that which contains all reality.
“The unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is conceived by the mind as a
being one and supreme; and thus reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the
primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely
necessary (Fackenheim, 1996).”


though working before Kant two years in corresponding work and completely own
in the method and style, Fichte’s work is based on the Kant’s practical
philosophy and is the further development of Kant’s work. In his study,
Fichte likes to concern ‘God’ as a being-in-himself, is a part of this World.
He might expose himself by interfering in the history of the world without at
specific times. It could be at the beginning of the world history or constantly
throughout the history. But this self-disclosure must be entirely related with moral
nature of human being. Unlike Kant, the God in Fichte is God’s absoluteness: God as the moral
Order of the World. God’s for the purpose of morality. When
Mankind or Humanity has drowned so deep that the morality which is created from
the pure reason has completely disappear inside of human being and lost their
power. It is a fact in this world and possibly happens. Under the circumstance
that this is a fact and happens to the world of sense, as the consequence of
the cause and effect which is attributed to a Supreme Being, may agree upon the
Law of Morality and force Mankind to follow and compliant. In other words, God
may expose himself immediately into the sense world when human sunk in sins and
give them the order to obey the moral law. In this work Fichte proves the
presentation of God as moral Being by giving a very clear moral proof. To
Fichte, the revelation of God is possible as the Maker and Giver of the moral
Law. And the revelation could only be in the purpose of the morality (Leighton,
1895, S. 143-153).


2.      The
philosophy in favor to Hegel


According to Schelling (1775-1854)
– a friend of Hegel, he always tries to step out of
and go far away from the philosophy of self-consciousness and the reflective
judgment, the moral Law. And with this attempt, Schelling decisively move
beyond the philosophy of Fichte. Unlike Fichte, the Absolute is self-being,
self-reveal and purely arises and interfere into the world of sense; to
Schelling, the question of the ‘Supreme Being’ is not his departure point.
However, the consciousness is now become his arising question as the
consequence from a process which is to be assumed from different dimensions,
not the Subject of self-consciousness side, but also from the other aspect. Indeed,
this relationship of subject and object can be grasped no more within
self-consciousness itself but be grounded in an absolute indifference which is the foundation that created
to this distinction. Therefore, it can only be predetermined but never be able
to reflective judgment or something to be. However, anyway, the question here
is not the relationship of the consciousness subject and the object anymore.
This correspondence is no longer in target, unlike the reflective philosophy.
The issue now is the explanation of the testification of the finiteness od the world
from a basement that is forever excluded from the infinite chain of
conditioned, finite, particular entities. However, not to trap into dualism,
the dualism between the unconditioned base on the one hand and the conditioned
infinite chain, finite existences on the other as Jacobi refers, Schelling choose
to explain the manifestation of the world of finiteness out of its
unconditioned ground, from an absolute indifference (Das).



At the beginning, Schelling
presuppose all the knowledge and assume that all the knowledge which is known
are the same between difference knowers. This is his first presupposition. With
this proposition, a question immediately arise which is whether between the truth
and knowledge exists any correspondence at that time. 

He starts with a
perfect identity of the known and the knower, an identity that cannot be detected
within subjectivity. With this notion of complete identity on subjectivity, the
common-sense understanding differentiates conditional knowledge, which is the
combination knowledge comes from reality from unconditional knowledge, which is
extracted from human intelligence and analytic and indeed is no real knowledge.
Moving beyond the conditional knowledge of the Absolute to the unconditional
knowledge of the Absolute which is an immediate affirmation of this
affirmation. As immediate knowledge of the absolute, Reason is Absolute

Reason as
mentioned here is the idea of God as ‘an immediate, absolute, unconditional identity’.
The Spirit unconditionally aware its absolute which can never be further based
in concept, is which Schelling calls ‘intellectual intuition’. It is called intuition
due to it concept is not mediated yet but still immediate, and it is
intellectual due to it stays beyond the reality and it has as its certify its
self-affirmation. As the unconditional base of knowledge, ‘intellectual
intuition’ is not even related to of inner sense. Indeed, what Fichte calls
‘intellectual intuition’ is not seen to be a product of the inner sense but belongs
to the unconditional absolute and stays beyond the self-consciousness circle. 


The nature of
Reason can be assumed to be ‘intellectual intuition’ whose thing is exclusively
the absolute which is unique and substance. By the high moral standards of this
affirmation, Reason acknowledges “the eternal impossibility of non-being”.
Being here is not an indication of God as something internal or external, but
God and being here is the product of analytic, immediately and unconditionally object
without duration. This absolute identity is infinite by high moral standards of
its idea. Thence, God can neither be concerned as the last result of the
self-negation of divergence, nor be included in a process of product. The
indivisibility and univocity of Being or God is neither a numerical idea nor a notion
of ensemble as aggregate unity of finite individual. This is due to the indivisibility
and univocity of the God is the base for infinite separation in form or by


God as the
absolute identity is a intrinsical, qualitative identity. Absolute indiscrimination
follows from the essential recognition of the absolute. Therefore, absolute indiscrimination
is not in-itself intrinsical but a quantitative recognition. Indeed, there is a
difference between absolute identity and absolute indiscrimination. The contradictory
between real and ideal, between subject and object grows out of this
indifference. This is the creation of the finite world. The theory of potencies
in triplicates here is explained by Schelling which are “the essential modes of
apparitions of the real and ideal universes”. Even the potencies in triplicates
are “the essential modes of apparitions” of the finite universes, they could
not be useable to the absolute identity.


Schelling, with
the theory of potencies, introduces the existing of the finite universes – the
are originally object. The finite’s existing, are non-being in respect to the
universal, is absolute identity, but examined independently, they are not perfectly
devoid of being. They are in part being and in part non-being. 



Hegel’s hypothesis






the time before Fichte’s work, God was noted as completely transcendent. God is
concerned as an inherent part of the world and cannot be separated from the
world in the age of Wissenschaftslehre.
It seems like the Wissenschaftslehre targets
to draw a logical conclusion from the absolute Ego to the individual Ego. The
absolute Ego is established as unconditioned ground of the individual Ego and
Non-Ego. From the individual Ego and Non- Ego, the unconditioned ground builds
up the absolute Ego. Base on this point, the definition of absolute Ego could
be understood as an “Ego in whose self-determination all the Non-Ego is
determined.” The concept of this absolute Ego is also the idea ‘God’ and the
belief in God is denoted by the exertion to attain this absolute Ego. Because
the human capability and knowledge has no practical perception of this idea,
therefore, we cannot be able go further from this unconditional belief. In the
empirical perception, it is known as God. On the other hand, in the theoretical
aspect, it is the Absolute Ego. Fichte also explain to Jacobi that Absolute
Ego in the Wissenschaftslehre can be understood as God, which
is deduced from the individual Ego (Leighton, 1895).


compare with the ‘God’ in Hegel, the idea of God that was identical with the
Absolute Ego which is drawn from the individual Ego seems to be the subjective
point of view and too abstract. It also seems to narrow down the power of ‘God’
to the world and the universal.


During the time which people show
the attitudes, behaviors and activities that have no religious aspect and no
spiritual basic, Charles Taylor has efforted to protect the phenomenon of
religion. However, in his study on the Western secularization, there is no clue
of the disappearing of religion, it was simply experiencing the change of
itself as a process of development. As I understand, this process is some point
relevant the process of development of History in Hegel’s Philosophy and he
uses the analogy of the phoenix to illustrate the process.


 In addition, Taylor analysis also demonstrates
that the significance of religion still remains firmly. It is not faded away or
decreases in any level. The religion presents in different way, stays private
and shows in public. To prove the being present and continuing existing of
religion, Taylor has indicated two points, we can call it the needed and
sufficient condition. The first one is for maintaining the human existing, the
need for supremacy is essential.  The
second is with only religion alone is sufficient to provide this essential need
of human. In other word, human’s existence need religion and with religion
alone is enough. Feasibly, Taylor was successful in proving the continuing existing
of religion because he understood the rule religion of play in our society and its
significance to the existence and development of mankind. When religion is understood in the
strong sense, as that which “involves the belief in a transcendental
reality which is not reducible to anything natural, and the aspiration to a
spiritual transformation which is not reducible to merely bodily or mental
wholeness and wellness,” then it can easily be undermined (Taylor, S. 20, 510). This way of explanation
depends on the concept of “transcendence” and its understanding, which has
its meaning, understanding and be recognized inherent in the existence. In general
speaking, to Taylor, the essential true transcendence which is needed for the existing
of human is the transcendence which is presented in the existence of religion.


         . By
means of critical-analysis, my thesis will demonstrate that both Kant and
Fichte provide contemporary ways of questioning the thesis that sees
transcendence as an unnecessary surplus to the already self-sufficient secular
immanent frame. They do so by showing not only the possibility but the
indispensability of transcendence, particularly with regards to the concept of
God, in the epistemological realm. On one hand, Kant provides a unique
epistemologicalmetaphysical framework in which the absence of knowledge of God
does not lead to the lack, the impossibility, or the irrationality of faith.
Rather, this absence is shown to be the precondition of a faith in God. On the
other hand, Fichte’s epistemological-metaphysical framework affords us the idea
that the absence of knowledge of God yields a genuine comprehension of God and
gives meaning and reality to the finite knowing subject. In this way, the
systematic and positive significance of the concept of God can be shown in both
figures. As such, the first task of this project involves the exposition and
analysis of a major problematic in Kant’s “philosophy of religion,” namely, the
apparent tension between the denial of the knowledge of God’s existence in his
Critique Of Pure Reason and his positive moral argument for the existence of
God in his Critique of Practical Reason. This part of the project advances two
sub-theses that speak to Kant’s deconstructive and constructive projects.
First, according to Kant’s epistemology or restrictions on knowledge,
metaphysical knowledge, i.e. of God’s existence, prized by traditional
philosophical theology, is impossible15. The relationship between epistemology
and metaphysics must presumably be mutually exclusive. Secondly however, such
lack of knowledge is essential insofar as the pursuit of metaphysical certainty
jeopardizes the very possibility of faith in God’s existence. It is precisely
these restrictions on knowledge that allow God to acquire reality, and allow
faith to acquire rational grounding, in the practical realm. The second task of
this project involves the exposition and analysis of a major problematic in
Fichte’s “philosophy of religion,” namely, the apparent tension between the
1804 Wissenschaftslehre’s quest for absolute metaphysical certainty or
knowledge of the Absolute and the impossibility of such absolute knowledge.
This part of the project advances two sub-theses. First, according to Fichte,
epistemology and metaphysics are so intimately related that the pursuit of
epistemological certainty inevitably leads to the pursuit of metaphysical
knowledge. However, metaphysical knowledge is paradoxically the knowledge of
the appearance of the Absolute, and thus denies any accessibility to the
Absolute as absolute. Absolute knowledge is impossible; the conditions which
make knowledge possible transcend knowledge. Secondly, the lack or absence of
absolute knowledge is precisely that which gives not only the Absolute, but
also the finite knowing subject, its meaning and reality. If God is to acquire
reality, the concept of God of traditional philosophical theology as merely
transcendent must be abandoned. Instead, the Absolute or God must be understood
in terms of its immanent transcendence. For Fichte, this means that, although
absolutely inconceivable, the Absolute or God as life reveals itself through
the I, which in turn stands as the living connection between the Absolute and
its manifestation or appearance. The third task of this project involves
comparing and contrasting the particular ways in which Kant and Fichte lend
support to Taylor’s overall project, namely, to challenge the “official
story” of Western secularization which encourages a closed interpretation
of the immanent frame. Although both Kant and Fichte demonstrate the
significance of the transcendent in human experience, theoretically and
practically speaking, they nonetheless differ in their understanding of the
nature of transcendence with relation to the concept of the God and the nature
of the human-divine relationship.


Schelling does not
pose the question concerning the essence of human freedom as the dialectical
problem between nature and freedom. Freedom does not appear here as the free
exercise of the rational Subject’s will to mastery over its sensuous nature,
but as the capacity to do evil. The question thus posed is no longer one
question amongst others but the metaphysical question concerning the
possibility of a system of freedom. On the one hand, freedom appears to be that
which cannot be included within a system at all; on the other hand, the demand
of Idealism that there must be a system without which nothing is adequately
comprehensible is not to be renounced.


however, disagrees with Jacobi’s use of a limited and restricted notion of
‘system’ and ‘freedom’, along with Jacobi’s restricted use of the metaphysical
and logical notion of judgment.


Later on, In the Freedom essay
Schelling attempts to re-interpret the logical and metaphysical notion of
judgment in such a manner that it opens up to the unconditioned character of
freedom without renouncing the demand of a system. This bond or jointure of
beings is grounded in freedom which, understood in more ordinary manner, is not
arbitrary free will but that belongs together with highest necessity. This
jointure of beings – the infinite, creative being of God and the finite,
created being called ‘man’ –