The writer of the book “a peace to end all peace” makes a strong case on the contribution of the European nations in the unrest and volatility in the Middle East. The author evaluates the decisions made by the European nations, especially, Britain, France and Germany, after WW1 and their effects on the situation in the Middle East.
He opines that these decisions were full of mistakes, miscalculations, misunderstandings, and inefficacy. The consequence of the decisions is the Middle East in his time; apparently, which is not much different for the present one. These decisions included the contributions of the politicians, the formation of the Arab bureau, making promises to the Arabs and allies. He also evaluates the effects of the British defeat on the future of the region.
During the time of the war, the making of judgments was the function of the assorted officers with varying capacities. These included civilians who had acquired credence to make such decisions through politics, such as Churchill. Others had arrived at their positions through long military service.
These groups of individuals had different incentives in their arriving at decisions. For example, when the war at Gallipoli proved to be a failure, Churchill, a politician, refused to consent to the fact because he could not admit his defeat, and Kitchener, an army officer, refused to accept defeat because it was a disaster to the reputation of the British army (Fromkin 159 & 165). These dissimilarities in motives amid the different individuals who were in the making of the decisions contributed to their ineffective nature.
Additionally, after the quitting of Fisher, the chief commanding officer, the intentions of other Admiralty Board remained hidden; leading to a period of speculations (160). After the opposition parties had been able to force Churchill out of the government, their intentions were devoid of accuracy, since they did not have a clear understanding of the situations in the battle fields (163).
The author, while describing the war, considers the Gallipoli war as deterministic in the progression of affairs in the Middle East. The war was significant for both parties, especially, the British, because it would have ended the stalemate. However, the defeat of a modern European army by a backward Asian army signified a lack of solution and a worsening of the situation (Fromkin 166).
Sykes had the jurisdiction in overseeing the joining of Arabs into the pool of British allies. The said individual consulted with a variety of individuals on matters concerning Arabs. These individuals had different motives, and Sykes did not practice discretion in the choice of what was true and genuine, and what was untrue.
There was a lack of central policy in such matters: difference officials were working in ignorance of what others were doing, often cross-purposing (170). The promises made to the Arabs lacked coherence, were easy to misunderstand. For example, the promises given to Emir Hussein led to his letter demanding kingdom; such confusions would not have led to any meaningful solutions to the problems in the east (174).
The last of the factor showing the contribution of the west to the situation in the Middle East, in this part of the book, is the defeat of the Britons in the battle at Tigris. The British had lost at Gallipoli, and further loss did not help the matter. The army faced rough terrain with no infrastructure. Their supplies run out, and they suffered defeat. Their standing and influence in the east was once again questioned (202).
Fromkin, David. A Peace to end all peace. New York: Henry Holt and company, 2001. Print.